David Kahn's Articles:

• An Historical Theory Of Intelligence

• Preface To A Sales Catalogue Of Antiquarian Books On Cryptography

• Charles J. Mendelsohn And Why I Envy Him

• The Navajo “Windtalkers”

• The Secret History Of The Author Of The Secret Front

• O L L I E R Preface

• Unveiling World War II’s Greatest Spy

• “Cryptology” in Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations

• Intelligence Studies on the Continent

• The Future of the Past: The Henry F. Schorreck Memorial Lecture

• The Prehistory of the General Staff

• Surprise and Secrecy: Two Thoughts

• The Rise of Intelligence

Bibliography:phy:

“Nothing Sacred: The Allied Solution of Vatican Codes in World War II.” In Michael Wala, ed., Gesellschaft und Diplomatie im transatlantischen Kontext: Festschrift für Reinhard R. Doerries zum 65. Geburtstag. USA-Studien, Band 11. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999. 217-220.

“A Historian’s Perspective.” Introduction, pp. vii-viii, to Special Issue on Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II of Intelligence and National Security, 14 (Spring 1999). reprinted as Foreward , pp. vii-viii .to David Alvarez, ed. Allied and Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

“Edward Bell and His Zimmermann Telegram Memorandums.” Intelligence and National Security, 14 (Autumn 1999), 143-159. With a portrait of Bell.

“Greatest Spy” in “Greatest Military Moments of the Twentieth Century,” MHQ; The Quarterly Journal of Military History, 12 (Winter 2000), 12. Hans-Thilo Schmidt, who revealed Enigma details to the French.

“Did Roosevelt Know?” New York Review of Books (2 November 2000), 59-60. A highly critical review of Robert B. Stinnett, Days of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor.

“The Code War.” The Washington Post (8 April 2001), p. C2 (Sunday Style section). A positive review of Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Enigma: The Battle for the Code.

“Why Weren’t We Warned?” World War II presents Pearl Harbor (undated Commemorative Issue; Anniversary Issue, [2001]), 82-88, 90-91, 96-97. Why solving Japanese codes didn’t warn us about the attack.

“Intelligence in World War II: A Survey.” The Journal of Intelligence History, 1 (Summer 2001), 1-20. Trans. as “Le Renseignement au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale,” 15-40 in Fabienne Mercier-Bernadet, directrice, 1939-1945: La Guerre des “Intelligences” (Paris: LaVauzelle, 2002).

“Enigma Uncracked.” in What If? 2: Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been. ed. Robert Cowley. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2001. pp. 305-316. The Allies fail to break the German cipher machine.

“An Historical Theory of Intelligence.” Intelligence and National Security, 16 (Autumn 2001), 79—97. Sigint made intelligence important; intelligence is essential to the defense. Translated [by Eric Dénécé] as “Pour une théorie générale de renseignement” in Renseignement et Opérations spéciales, No. 11 (2002), 19-40.

“When Navajos Fought Japanese For Ne-He-Mah.” The New York Times (15 June 2001), B7:1-2, B9. Why the Navajo language was such a good code.

“You Can’t Tell the Oysters Without a Map.” Newsday (Travel) (30 June 2002), E 15. Marennes and its oysters.

Préface to Alexandre Ollier, La Cryptographie militaire avant la guerre de 1914 (Paris: LaVauzelle, 2002), 5-6.

“Cryptology.” in Dictionary of American History, 3rd edition. Stanley I. Kutler, editor in chief. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, Thomson, Gale, 2003. 2:467-468.

“Introduction: The Secret History of the Author of The Secret Front.” in Wilhelm Höttl, The Secret Front: Nazi Political Espionage 1938-1945. New York: Enigma Books, 2003. pp. i-ix.

“The Wreck of the Magdeburg.” in The Great War: Perspectives on the First World War, ed. Robert Cowley. New York: Random House, 2003. pp. 141-153.

Copyright © 2008 David Kahn. All rights reserved.